Posted by Despite its international popularity, soccer has struggled for acceptance in the United States. Only 2% of Americans said that soccer was their favorite sport to watch in a 2006 Gallup poll, placing the “beautiful game” behind auto racing, golf and ice/figure skating. Soccer (7%) passed those sports and closed the gap on baseball (9%) in the 2017 Gallup poll, but still ranks far behind basketball (11%) and Football (37%).
Although soccer is not the favorite sport of most Americans, the United States can still become an international soccer powerhouse. A major reason is the number of young people who play soccer. FIFA’s 2006 Big Count found that the United States had over 2.3 million registered male youth players, more than any other country in the world.
In an effort to maximize the potential of this vast pool of young players, the US Soccer Federation (USSF) launched the Development Academy in 2007. An ambitious project given the size of the United States, the Development Academy looked to streamline elite youth development in the United States by forming a top tier of youth clubs across the country, including teams associated with Major League Soccer (MLS) franchises. Teams were initially split across two age groups (U15/U16 and U17/U18), but the league eventually expanded to include U12, and U13/U14 divisions, with nearly 150 teams in total.
However, the economic burden on the USSF was huge. The Development Academy was projected to lose the USSF $7 million in 2020 and $8 million in 2021. Furthermore, fissures appeared between MLS academy teams in the DA and non-MLS clubs. The MLS teams complained about a perceived lack of competitiveness from non-MLS clubs allowing for too many easy games. Meanwhile, the non-MLS clubs voiced concerns over travel costs and a changing league structure that favored the MLS teams. Ultimately, the financial effects of the COVID-19 pandemic were the final nail in the coffin for the Development Academy, which was permanently shut down on April 15.
Between the infighting amongst DA clubs and the economic struggles, it is unlikely that the Development Academy will be missed. However, the DA worked to address some of the biggest impediments to the improvement of youth soccer development in the United States, including the shortage of qualified youth coaches and the discriminatory effects of the so-called “pay-to-play” system. Although the Development Academy was unable to fix these problems, its efforts will be missed. The Development Academy was less effective at resolving other problems impeding youth soccer development, including the dominance of college soccer programs whose short playing seasons limit player improvement. The discussion below examines some of the impediments to youth soccer development in the U.S. and the effect that the Development Academy did, or did not, have on removing these impediments.
Dominance of Limited-Season College Soccer
College sports are an institution in the United States. College football and basketball are enormously popular, and provide a high level of amateur competition that prepares players for the professional ranks. For decades, college soccer has been a major supplier of talent for the United States Men’s National Team. However, the rules of college soccer are detrimental to the development of world-class players.
As is the case with 24 other college sports, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) controls college soccer in the United States. Without input from the USSF or MLS, the NCAA has created a rule system that translates poorly to professional soccer. Some of these rules are relatively minor (although they are annoyingly inconsistent with play at the professional level). For example, college coaches can make up to 11 substitutions at a time, and each player is allowed re-entry in the second half. There are also no limits on roster size, and the game clock stops counting for penalty kicks, injuries, and other breaks in play.
Far more significant and damaging, however, are the NCAA rules that limit the length of the soccer season, resulting in a crowded schedule of games during the short season, and no competitive game structure in the balance of the year. The season takes place in the fall, with teams playing twice a week from late August to mid-November. After the conference tournaments and national championships conclude in December, the interaction coaches are allowed to have with their players is severely reduced until pre-season training begins the following August. This calendar deprives players of the structured year-round training that is crucial to their progression.
Unfortunately, the lack of a consistent year-round training environment also exists lower down the development pyramid. High school soccer is a fall sport in most of the United States, which allows players to turn out for their club side only in the spring. As a result, players who join their high school teams do not have the advantage of a consistent year-round training regimen. In 2012, the Development Academy dealt with this problem by banning DA players from representing their high schools. With DA teams playing 25-30 games over a consistent 10-month season, the Development Academy mimicked the demands placed on a professional player in one of Europe’s top leagues.
Although the Development Academies succeeded at creating a year-round program for the best high-school-aged players, because the DA programs ended after U18/19 level, they were unable to wield the same influence over college soccer that they did over high school soccer. This resulted in a Men’s National Team that has been predominantly composed of former college players who did not benefit from a consistent year-round training environment during their college years. For example, the Men’s National Team squads from the 2014 World Cup, the decisive World Cup Qualifiers against Panama and Trinidad & Tobago from October 2017 and the 2019 Gold Cup were composed of a total of 43 players. Of those 43 players, 28 (65%) played college soccer. Although 15 of the 43 had Development Academy experience, nine of those 15 played in college before turning pro, meaning that they did not benefit from a consistent training regime in their college years.
Unlike most DA clubs, MLS academies can offer their best players professional contracts instead of allowing them to leave for college at the end of their DA stint. Historically, however, MLS clubs have allowed many of these players to leave for college without offering them a contract, thus perpetuating the enduring influence of college soccer on elite young talent. Much of the fault here lies with the MLS Homegrown Player Rule, which allows MLS clubs to retain the right to later sign former academy players who leave the academy for college. This removes much of the incentive for an MLS team to offer such players a professional contract when they leave the academy to make sure that they do not lose them to another club. As a result, many of the Men’s National Team players are former MLS academy players who left their MLS club for college without receiving a contract offer before their departure. Of the previously mentioned nine future USMNT players with DA and college experience, eight of them played in the DA for an MLS academy. These players would likely have improved more quickly had they been signed to professional deals straight from the academy and then placed on the MLS club’s first team or loaned out to another club. Obviously, attending college has other potential benefits beyond soccer, but looked at purely from a player-development standpoint, college soccer is detrimental to the development of the best USMNT prospects.
Shortage of Qualified Coaching
Another obstacle holding-back youth soccer in the United States is the shortage of qualified coaching. Despite the large number of registered players in America, leading European nations have far more qualified coaches per player. Coaches can demonstrate their qualifications by taking coaching courses that lead to the award of various levels of coaching licenses, with A licenses and B licenses being the 2 highest levels for youth soccer. Relying on 2006 FIFA Big Count data, the table below compares the number of male youth players per coaches with an A-level or B-level license in the United States with similar data from four European countries.
| Country | A License Coaches |
B License Coaches |
Players per A-Licensed Coach |
Players per B-Licensed Coach |
| USA | 2,500 | 5,000 | 938 | 469 |
| Holland | 901 | 3,071 | 518 | 152 |
| Germany | 5,633 | 21,731 | 328 | 85 |
| Italy | 1,556 | 37,742 | 356 | 15 |
| France | 3,030 | 12,200 | 332 | 82 |
The data shows that the United States has a far higher number of players per highly qualified coach than the four European countries. The United States has almost 2 times as many players per A-level coach as Holland, and almost 3 times as many as Germany. The relative shortage of qualified coaches in the U.S. is even starker in the B license category. The United States has more than 3 times as many players per B-level coach as Holland, and a whopping 31 times as many as Italy. Looked at another way, assuming every registered male youth player is on a team with 25 players, the Unites States would have one A- or B-licensed coach for every 12.5 youth teams, while Italy would have 1.8 such coaches for every team, or almost two per team. Although the gap between the United States and these European powerhouses is considerable, the Development Academy worked to reduce it. All technical coaches were required to have at least a B license, while academy directors needed an A license. The DA’s efforts to reduce the shortage of qualified coaches will be missed.
Like the inadequate preparation high school and college soccer provide for the professional game, the lack of qualified coaches in the U.S. is a problem that affects only the limited world of American soccer. The struggles of the poor and minority groups in the United States for inclusion and equal opportunity, on the other hand, is an issue with far-reaching implications. In soccer, those struggles manifest themselves in the pay-to-play system.
Pay-to-Play’s Discriminatory Limitation on the Player Pool
Pay-to-play refers to the fees required for young players to join elite travel teams. Located mostly in the suburbs, many of these youth teams charge a base fee of $3,000 a year, with some teams charging up to $12,000 a year. As a result, how far a young player climbs the country’s development ladder often depends on the wealth of his family, which prevents many players from poorer families, who are often members of racial or ethnic minorities, from being scouted and identified as future professionals.
Although most of these travel teams offer scholarships to players with financial difficulties, these scholarships typically only cover the cost of playing in the games, not the often-high transportation costs. This causes tension between parents paying full price and scholarship players. Nick Lusson, the director of NorCal Premier Soccer Foundation that helps to grow soccer in underserved California communities, has witnessed paying parents asking scholarship kids “Why did you miss the game on Saturday? We are paying for you to be here.” Furthermore, scholarship players and their families are sometimes subjected to racial profiling in the games they do travel to play in. Lusson tells of non-white parents taking their scholarship kids to games only to be pulled over by police wondering what they are doing in the largely white suburban neighborhoods in which the games are frequently played.
Considering that the USSF President during the majority of the Development Academy era, Sunil Gulati, once called the potential elimination of pay-to-play “nonsensical”, it is unsurprising that the system was used in the DA. However, a comprehensive scholarship program was instituted in 2008 to reduce the travel costs associated with DA participation for low-income players. In 2018-19, the program gave out 565 scholarships, with an average value of $1,469. Of the 565 scholarship recipients, 126 were in the Youth National Team pool and 15 were Youth National Team players. Furthermore, 86% of the players supported were non-white.
In the last few years, the Development Academy’s commitment to prioritizing a player’s skill over their ability to pay began to pay dividends. Of the previously examined 15 USMNT players with DA experience, two-thirds were from non-white backgrounds, including three Latinos (20%).
Shortly after the dissolution of the Development Academy was announced, MLS released plans to create their own youth league amongst MLS academy sides. This new league will be free of many of the ills that plague youth soccer in the United States. MLS academy teams cover all costs for their players, removing pay-to-play worries. These players will train year-round and work with the best youth coaches in the country. Furthermore, the players are at clubs that can offer them the chance to turn professional without playing college soccer first.
DA Orphans
Although non-MLS teams could be included in the new MLS academy league, the disappearance of the Development Academy is a setback for the more than 120 non-MLS clubs that participated in the Development Academy and the nearly 10,000 players on the rosters of those clubs. If the former DA clubs are not invited into the MLS league, it is unlikely that the leagues they join will be as committed to solving the problems that have ailed America’s attempts to become an elite soccer nation. Many ex-Development Academy players could be allowed to play high school soccer again, eliminating the possibility of a consistent year-round training environment. Former Development Academy clubs may no longer be required to hire USSF A and USSF B licensed coaches. U.S. Club Soccer and U.S. Youth Soccer, which oversee the competitions that many of the clubs will join, do not have anywhere near the $150 million windfall of the USSF, leaving them with less money to spend on scholarships to reduce the burden of pay-to-play on economically disadvantaged players. By continuing to shield the roughly 2,500 MLS academy players from the ills of youth soccer development in the United States and leaving the other elite players to face them head on, the quality of youth soccer in America will undoubtedly suffer.
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